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In the last fifteen years or so, political philosophers have been increasingly busy nurturing 
their latest darling, global justice (hereinafter GJ). There are many reasons why justice, the 
centrepiece of much political theorising since the 1970s, has spilled beyond the confines of 
the (nation-)state – from certain inherent features of prominent philosophical accounts of 
justice to the seemingly morally arbitrary nature of state borders to the perceived or assumed 
effects of globalisation. In any case, the previously rather scattered reflections on the global 
dimension on justice-related topics have now moulded into a respected academic 
enterprise, generating a vast body of mutually interconnected research. Under the broad 
umbrella of GJ, a wealth of specific problems and/or issue areas have surfaced; for the 
purposes of the present essay, it is useful to note that the primarily normative discussion about 
justice in the transnational realm (i.e. what is right/wrong and what should be done about it) 
extends to questions of methodological, epistemological as well as ontological kind which 
are of wider interest to political philosophy as such. 
One reason for such a broadened perspective is that two of the three titles (Brooks and 
Brock) appeared in print four and five years ago, respectively, and Brock’s and Ypi’s volumes 
have already received wide critical attention from within the field.1 It makes therefore sense 
to step back and evaluate the respective contributions with the benefit of hindsight, and also 
perhaps more critically than has been the case with the majority of heretofore published 
reactions. This is facilitated by the different approaches employed in the respective books, 
stemming in one case (Brooks) from its genre, and from different authorial aims and modes of 
explication in the other two cases. 
 
Issues in global justice theorising 
What are then the main problems, questions and cleavages that we may expect GJ 
theorists to address? First, on the normative level, one may lean towards either of two broad 
camps, that of cosmopolitans and that of statists (also labelled as nationalists or 
internationalists, depending on the specific issues in question).2 The issue here is the normative 
relevance of state borders and/or national ties and state sovereignty in deciding the scope 
and weight of the demands of justice.3 Brooks’ volume provides a useful introduction here, 
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offering a number of perspectives from both sides, although cosmopolitan views are (at least 
numerically) more widely represented. Both Brock and Ypi defend an unambiguously 
cosmopolitan position while attempting to accommodate – or reject, where 
accommodation seems impossible – the most significant statist/nationalist arguments. 
These may, second, apply to numerous substantive issues and/or policy domains, such as 
socio-economic justice, just war and humanitarian intervention, human rights, poverty in the 
world, or national self-determination. Again Brooks is especially instructive on this level, 
because he divides his collection of papers into altogether eleven self-contained micro-
debates on particular issues. This is partly emulated in Brock who devotes about one third of 
her book to what might be called “applied political theory” in areas such as immigration, 
taxation, poverty reduction, or visions of global democratic governance. Although Ypi shares 
similar practice-oriented goals, her account is the most “philosophical” one, incorporating 
substantive discussion into a thick theoretical narrative of how best to approach GJ. 
This is why her book shines most with regard to the third level of theorising, because she 
tackles head-on some difficult yet important metatheoretical issues that accompany GJ 
theorising (we could also speak of “methodology” in the broadest sense): How to interpret 
the relationship between theory (philosophy) and practice? Is it possible to reconcile the 
utopian edge of cosmopolitan justice with awareness of real-world constraints on political 
action and institutional design (which is a major difficulty treated in political philosophy under 
the twin heading of ideal and non-ideal theory)? Can we pursue cosmopolitan ends without 
introducing a global coercive political authority, a kind of cosmopolitan Leviathan? Statists 
usually bring forward non-ideal concerns with feasibility and stability, and a major task thus 
awaits cosmopolitans, namely to show how the rather demanding goals of GJ could be 
achieved in a world dominated presently by states and state-based international bodies. 
While Ypi’s book is explicitly framed along these lines, Brock does not ignore them either – one 
of her main aims is to rebut what she calls “Feasibility Sceptics” – but concentrates more on 
justifying her own normative position and particular institutional solutions to pressing moral 
issues. Brooks’s volume has little systematic to say on these problems, apart from occasional 
ventures in several of the selected papers, though this is quite natural given its genre. 
Analogous summary applies also to the last level of theorising I will identify here, one that 
is intimately bound with the previous three: What is the vocation of a GJ theorist? After all, 
due to its being political philosophy (thus forming one of the pillars of practical philosophy), 
the discipline has an obvious practical side, attempting not only to analyse and evaluate the 
social world, but also to provide guidelines to political action.4 Brock and Ypi take a clearly 
activist stance, although in their own distinct ways, jointly identifying the insularity of abstract 
academic reflection on GJ a major reason why little progress has been achieved in the real 
world. Again, Brooks leaves it to the reader to pick sides, although I believe that enriching his 
Introduction with a short discussion of these issues would have been a good idea. 
 
Reading global justice with Thom Brooks 
I have already hinted to several features of Thom Brooks’s edited collection of, as he puts it, 
“the best work in the area from contemporary political philosophy and its history” by “the 
most influential writers on global justice” (p. xii). Towards the end of the Introduction, Brooks 
reveals what is probably the main aim of the Global Justice Reader (GJR) – namely to 
“[make] the task of those coming to work in this area for the first time far easier” (p. xxi). It is 
therefore probably best to conceive it as primarily a teaching resource, and secondly as an 
invitation to the field for non-specialists, be it researchers outside political philosophy or 
curious politicians or political activists. Seen from this perspective, it certainly succeeds in the 
chosen task, though there are several misgivings I will point out below. 
GJR is divided into eleven parts plus the Introduction, each consisting of two to five full-
length scholarly papers on the respective topics (apart from the occasional document such 
as excerpts from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). These are, in order as 
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they appear in the book, Sovereignty, Rights to Self-Determination, Human Rights, Rawls’s The 
Law of Peoples, Nationalism and Patriotism, Cosmopolitanism, Global Poverty and 
International Distributive Justice, Just War, Terrorism, Women and Global Justice, and 
International Environmental Justice. As such, the book offers a broad and diverse survey of 
the philosophical landscape, and it would be generally unfair to try to fish around for topics 
that should have been included but were not – this is largely a matter of individual scholarly 
taste. Brooks’s disclaimer that “any Reader must be selective” (p. xxi) is certainly relevant 
here, and he makes up for the potential omissions with an expanded bibliography. That said, I 
cannot but feel surprised that two major issue areas have not found their way to the GJR, 
namely global democracy (or the question of institutional structures designed to implement 
GJ) and (im)migration. These constitute long-standing problems of political philosophy (unlike, 
say, environmental justice), and an authoritative volume such as the GJR should have 
probably paid at least a formal tribute to them – at least in the Editor’s Introduction. 
A related quibble relates to the sequence of the parts. If understood as primarily a 
teaching and “invitational” resource, one may reasonably expect the GJR to follow some 
kind of method in the ordering – for example, chronological (“youth” of the topics), practice-
related (regarding the degree of success in implementation), or, what I consider the best 
alternative, according to the level of generality (most general to most particular). Since unlike 
in the other two books, there is – quite naturally – no overarching theoretical framework 
available, a clear method of ordering would have made it easier to apprehend how the 
different issue areas relate to and influence each other. For example, the part on 
Cosmopolitanism (consisting of texts by Kant, Habermas and Pogge) comes sixth, while it 
addresses (together with Human Rights which come third) perhaps the most general issue of 
all – that of moral universalism. Similarly, one would probably expect the topic of human rights 
(including Peter Jones’s piece on group rights) precede that of Rights to Self-Determination, 
given that the latter is itself one of the human rights enshrined in the UDHR and related 
documents. 
Perhaps these are really just quibbles – after all, teachers are free to choose their own 
ordering of topics and amend GJR with other texts. There is however another dimension to all 
this: Because the volume presents itself as providing an accessible report on the “state of the 
(sub)discipline” (i.e. GJ), we would expect a robust explication of how the respective topics 
relate to global justice. Taken as a whole, GJR is at times reminiscent of a general collection 
of papers on international ethics or international political theory. It goes without saying that 
terrorism or national self-determination do somehow relate to justice, and Brooks’s 
Introduction is useful in tracing these links. The thing is, they may be – and most of the time 
have been – dealt with in complete isolation from what constitutes the basic substrate of 
contemporary debates on GJ. Without making clear these deeper connections, the book 
leaves one wondering what is so special about GJ and what makes it distinct from 
international ethics/political theory in general. 
But perhaps again, this is the fate of all readers on immensely complex topics, which GJ 
certainly is. Let me therefore spend a few comments on the contents of GJR, keeping in mind 
the difficulties of the editorial job – including the unfortunate fact that no amount of pages 
can accommodate all the interesting work in the field. On the one hand, Brooks has done a 
good job selecting some of the most important or most cited texts in the given issue areas, 
including the occasional venture to classical authors such as Hobbes, Kant or Aquinas. The 
reader thus gets familiar with, among others, the work of Pogge and Beitz on state 
sovereignty, of Buchanan on secession, Pogge’s critique of Rawls’s account of international 
justice, Singer’s famous utilitarian take on famine in the world and corresponding obligations, 
Walzer’s contributions to thinking about just war and terrorism, Okin’s feminist critique of 
multiculturalism, or Caney’s focused defence of duties stemming from environmental 
pollution. All these, as well as the rest I cannot mention here, outline the rich and multi-
dimensional nature of contemporary thinking on GJ. 
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On the other hand, readers familiar with the terrain of GJ theorising may feel that the 
coverage is somewhat unbalanced. Before proceeding, I wish to recall my earlier comments 
regarding the absence of an overarching perspective: While not of serious concern in itself, it 
becomes more problematic with respect to the following observations. 
There are two facets to this imbalance. For one, some parts are quite biased towards a 
certain – in most cases cosmopolitan – perspective. Take, for example, the first part on 
Sovereignty: Besides the 14th chapter of Hobbes’s Leviathan, the reader gets acquainted with 
Pogge’s and Beitz’s critiques of Rawls’s ultimately statist position.5 Now both have been of 
great importance to the development of the debate; however, many interesting and 
important defences of the normative (as opposed to simply political or legal) significance of 
states or state sovereignty have been put forward since the Beitz’s Political Theory and 
International Relations (1979/1999) and Pogge’s “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereingty” (1992) 
were published – defences that have gained intense if critical attention.6 Since sovereignty is 
one of the main battlefields between cosmopolitans and internationalists, it is curious why 
none of these contributions have been included in this part. True, Nagel’s “The Problem of 
Global Justice” appears in Part VII (Global Poverty and International Economic Justice), 
nevertheless a contemporary argument of this particular kind is sorely missing in Part I (also, 
Nagel explicitly refers to Hobbes in his paper). 
Similar worries apply to Parts IV (Rawls’s Law of Peoples) and V (Nationalism and 
Particularism): Although Pogge’s 1994 critique of Rawls’s early eponymous paper7 is certainly 
significant in its own right, it (a) addresses the 1993 paper and not the 1999 book from the 
excerpt by Rawls is taken, and (b) again was followed by a number of important defences 
that unpacked Rawls’s arguments and assumptions. Since Rawls’s work on international 
justice has been, as usual, central to the development of the debate, such an omission seems 
hard to justify. The same goes for part V which presents only Miller’s 1995 defence of the 
“ethical significance of nationality”: Given that the other two papers (by Goodin and 
Nussbaum) express strongly cosmopolitan (anti-nationalist/patriotic) views, I cannot but 
wonder why pro-patriotic and pro-nationalist arguments are so heavily underrepresented 
here (not least when the following chapter on Cosmopolitanism continues on the same 
wave). 
My other critical comment on selection of the papers restates the issue with unclear 
criteria of selection. I proceed by way of examples here: First, although Beitz’s “Human Rights 
as a Common Concern” (Part III) certainly represents a major contribution to the debate on 
justification of human rights (HR) as well as their connection to the socio-economic face of 
GJ, what is conspicuously missing here are the positions he attacks (be it libertarians in the 
normative dimension or foundationalist in the metaethical one). Insofar as HR are regularly 
conceived of as a (perhaps the) proxy of GJ,8 this is again a strange omission. Second, as 
James T. Johnson has recently argued, contemporary philosophical accounts of the just war, 
grounded as they are in Anglo-American analytic philosophy, probably do not constitute a 
direct continuation of the “just war tradition” dating back to Augustine or Aquinas (as the 
Editor claims at p. xii; see also my further comments in the next section). Third, Okin’s critique 
of multiculturalism (Part X) came under heavy attack from feminist circles themselves – for 
example in Allison Jaggar’s article which reframes the discussion on women and non-western 
cultures in the very context of GJ theorising, adopting Pogge’s analytic framework (perhaps 
one that is most extensively presented in the volume) to reject a narrow culturalist view of the 
plight of women in non-liberal countries.9 
From this I derive my final concern with GJR: It is exclusively Western, or Western-political-
theory-oriented. Nowhere is this trait more apparent than in Part III on Human Rights where 
one could expect at least a passing mention of the culturalist (e.g. Asian-values) debate on 
the nature of HR, or of the developing intercultural dialogue on HR which aims at eradicating 
widespread suspicion of cultural and intellectual imperialism. As long as GJ theorising aims to 
have a truly global reach, this dimension should not have gone unnoticed in a volume that 
aspires to provide an authoritative overview of the field. 
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For the third and final time, I admit that my gripes may sound like an exercise in mere 
cherry-picking, or like incapability of charitable reading. To conclude this part of my essay, let 
me therefore stress that Brooks’s Global Justice Reader will serve as an invaluable resource for 
students, first-comers and non-specialists, as well as a useful quick-reference guide for 
researchers in the field – not least thanks to its expanded bibliography. Its weaknesses come 
quite naturally with its genre and the need to make editorial compromises, and it is fair to say 
that I do not presently know of any comparable volume of such breadth and complexity. I 
will now turn to the other two books which attempt to “patch up” what is missing in GJR. 
 
Implementing Global Justice With Brock 
Gillian Brock sets in her book Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account (GJCA)  two 
general and interrelated goals for herself: First, to show “[w]hat… would a globally just world 
look like” (p. 4), and second, to convince the reader that such cosmopolitan model of GJ 
can be viable – that is, it can coherently combine fundamental respect to individual human 
beings as the ultimate units of moral concern with the need to leave enough space for 
legitimate particularist affiliations and attachments. Her contribution to the field stands out 
due to the author’s explicit commitment to issues of implementation of theoretical solutions, 
whereby Brock wishes to show that voices doubting their feasibility – who she dubs Feasibility 
Sceptic(s) – are unjustified or plainly wrong. 
Brock thus very much focuses on the second level of GJ theorizing identified in the first 
section of my essay, i.e. one that concerns the relationship between theory and practice 
(Brock uses the terminology of ideal and non-ideal theory only once, towards the conclusion 
of chapter III). On my reading, this is the most distinctive feature of her account of GJ, 
because the other line of the argument, targeting the group of non-believers she calls 
Nationalism Sceptic(s) and contextualizing GJCA on the first level of theorizing, represents a 
regular and in a sense necessary aspect of any cosmopolitan take on GJ (which is not to say 
that she does not put forward some interesting partial critiques of the statist/nationalist 
position). 
Brock is a cosmopolitan about justice, which means that she fully accepts two basic 
ideas – that all individuals have equal moral worth, no matter where they are situated 
geographically, and that there are certain obligations to all human beings that are binding 
on us all, again no matter where we live (p. 15) – or more precisely, on all of us who are 
capable of carrying out these obligations. This is consistent with her main mode of justification 
of cosmopolitan principles of GJ, that is, a modified Rawlsian original position extended to 
randomly selected representatives of all individuals in the world.10 Brock argues that upon 
reflection of “urgent global problems” and possible remedies, and while ignorant of their own 
allegiances and certain important class of information such as the demographics of world 
population,11 delegates would opt for a system that guarantees equal basic liberties (of the 
civil and political type) and protection against certain harms threatening basic needs. A 
global governance structure, most likely retaining states as principal actors, and fair terms of 
global cooperation (including fair ownership of natural resources) would then constitute the 
necessary means to achieving these ends. 
Although Brock intends to reconceptualise the principle of state sovereignty in a 
fundamental way, so that it allows for what she calls “joint sovereignty” shared between 
states and supranational institutions (52–53), thus rendering state legitimacy conditional on 
fulfilling cosmopolitan obligations derived from the wider framework of GJ (Ch. 7), she 
positions herself against more demanding accounts of global egalitarian justice (one such 
account is defended in Lea Ypi’s book). By rejecting calls for global extension of Rawls’s 
principles of justice – the difference principle and fair equality of opportunity – which would 
entail policies aimed at equalizing life conditions worldwide (that is, reducing or eliminating 
the gap between the rich&powerful and the poor&weak), and preferring a sufficientarian 
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framework, Brock hopes to render her theory more realistic (practice-related) with regard to 
“here and now”, while still retaining a strong utopian (ideal and transformational) element. 
Here her earlier conceptual distinctions (pp. 11–13) between (a) moral and institutional, 
(b) extreme and moderate (with respect to both justification and content), and (c) strong 
and weak versions of cosmopolitanism acquire major importance, because they show how 
one can be a cosmopolitan about justice yet steer clear of the spectre of world-statism and 
cultural intolerance – at least in principle, because I will argue below that especially the first 
distinction most likely cannot do the job it is supposed to. In any case, Brock believes that her 
account coherently shows how permissible partial affiliations and loyalties are possible in a 
world regulated by cosmopolitan principles of justice – in other words, that there is no 
necessary conflict between them. 
In chapters 5–9, Brock substantiates this general claim by analysing several policy areas 
that she considers either especially relevant to her project or particularly illuminating as for 
the problem of implementation: Global poverty and taxation, basic liberties and mechanisms 
of their protection, humanitarian intervention, immigration, and global economic relations. In 
each of the chapters she explores both the current situation “on the ground”, often helped 
by quite extensive empirical data, and concrete mechanisms and institutional structures that 
would be most conductive to realising her cosmopolitan goals. At least three parts of her 
discussion are worth praising for their originality (notwithstanding the fact that I remain 
ultimately sceptical with regard to their persuasiveness): First, her overview of the global 
taxation regime, including specific taxation instruments and rough calculations of the 
potential revenue – here Brock elaborates in detail upon tentative suggestions by other 
cosmopolitans about justice.12 Second, her insistence on the crucial role of free press for 
securing and protecting basic liberties, which she considers a necessary complement to the 
external sanctioning and enforcing role of the International Criminal Court. Third, her 
discussion of (im)migration, the upshot of which may come as a surprise to cosmopolitans 
and anti-cosmopolitans alike: Brock effectively argues for reducing immigration flows from 
poor to rich countries, citing many detrimental effects of “brain drain” on those societies 
which should be the primary beneficiaries of cosmopolitan justice. Of course, raising barriers 
for immigration has to be offset by policy changes on the part of rich countries, included 
expanded material assistance and global redistributive measures aimed at improving life 
conditions in poor states. 
In chapters 10–13, Brock then returns to a more theoretical mode of argumentation, 
dealing first with reservations of two eminent Nationalism Sceptics (David Miller and Yael 
Tamir), subsequently showing in more detail how her account of GJ accommodates relevant 
nationalist/statist concerns, and finally explaining in what sense GJCA retains a strong 
egalitarian core, despite her earlier rejection of standard versions of global egalitarianism. 
Regarding the last point, Brock adopts Elisabeth Anderson’s well-known perspective on 
genuine democratic equality which subsumes redistributionist, goods-based egalitarian 
theories under a wider conception of equality that is primarily concerned with inequalities of 
respect, recognition, and power (p. 298). Here Brock gives some flesh to the concept of 
moral cosmopolitanism which forms the core of possibly any cosmopolitan theory; that is, the 
conviction that all human being belong to an all-encompassing community of humankind 
and are therefore endowed with universal claims and obligations.13 She then argues that this 
conception of “relational equality” harmonises nicely with her previous notion of responsive 
democracy, that is, her version of global governance structures (309ff.). 
This is also where I start developing my critical comments on GJCA. As mentioned above, 
Brock’s book is meant as a long and detailed answer to two kinds of sceptics, those worrying 
about feasibility/stability and those concerned with special attachments and loyalties such as 
national ties. There is, however, a third kind of sceptical attitude towards projects of 
cosmopolitan justice, one that points to the looming incoherence between their ambitious 
moral demands and restrained visions of institutional structures that are entrusted with the 
task of realising these goals. I have argued elsewhere that one cannot “have the cake and 
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eat it”, that is, one cannot propose highly aspiring moral visions of the new global order while 
simultaneously claiming that they may be brought into existence without establishing a global 
coercive political authority – not least because there will always be powerful players who 
oppose such a move.14 
Now Brock seemingly escapes these charges by rejecting global egalitarianism 
concerned with the reduction of relative inequalities. That is why she feels justified in claiming 
that “no dramatic changes in international law” (p. 136, in the context of the global taxation 
regime) and “no radical institutional transformation” (315) would be required, and that her 
account of GJ is moderate in both justification and content (316; room for “permissible 
nationality” being a part of the evidence here). There are, however, at least two general 
reasons why Brock’s claim is open to serious doubt: First, her account of “responsive 
democracy” combines elements from democratic theories of David Held, Daniel Weinstock 
and Andrew Kuper. Short of straightforward world-statists, however, these “models” of global 
democracy are epitomes of proposals for a fairly radical institutional transformation of the 
global order. At any rate, neither of these authors considers states as the prospectively still 
central actors of global politics, as Brock – though tentatively – does (p. 53). 
While this doubt is perhaps deflectable by switching to more restrained yet still 
progressive conceptions of global politics – after all, Brock approvingly cites Robert 
Keohane’s work on transparency and accountability in international politics –, my second 
charge is more problematic for the author, because it concerns Brock’s/Anderson’s 
conception of democratic (relational) equality. On the one hand, global redistribution of 
goods plays an instrumental role in the conception, and as Brock duly notes, also entails 
attention to burdens of those who will be on the losing end of GJ. On the other hand, 
securing democratic equality seems to require extensive legal, administrative, and control 
measures or mechanisms, because doing away with inequalities of respect, recognition and 
power entails changes both in the prevailing institutional structure (domestic or global) and in 
symbolic and identity frameworks, at least on the part of citizens of rich and powerful 
countries. This much follows logically from Anderson’s position, and, interestingly and most 
likely causing incoherence in Brock’s own account, Brock admits that securing relational 
equality would require “an array of protections” (p. 313). To drive the point home, a multitude 
of “protections” implemented globally are hardly conceivable without an all-powerful, 
coercive global political authority – that is, without a world-state. Put differently, claiming 
moderatedness does not equal being ultimately moderate. 
In this sense, the apparent strength of GJCA consisting in extensive attention to partial 
feasible solutions very much betrays the deeper difficulties besetting most accounts of 
cosmopolitan justice, including Brock’s. For example, her proposal to establish a global 
taxation regime which would constitute the metaphorical spine of a just cosmopolitan order 
relies on the assumption that consent and/or support of “powerful players” (likely covering 
contemporary powers such as the USA, Russia or China) will not be needed for the 
implementation of principles of GJ and their efficient enforcement (p. 136). I am afraid that 
this is simply an example of wishful thinking: It may be true that certain steps in the desired 
direction(s) have been already taken, or that increasingly sophisticated theoretical work has 
been appearing recently (as Brock repeatedly emphasises). But it is an entirely different thing 
to extrapolate from these tentative steps a sweeping hope that GJ is about to march 
forward, attitudes of powerful players notwithstanding. I believe that a more extensive 
engagement with recent work in (the theory of) international relations would have done 
great service to the “realistic” face of GJCA, even if it might have toned down its apparent 
normative optimism.15 
Similar worries spring up with regard to Brock’s claim that GJCA leaves ample or at least 
sufficient room for legitimate special attachments. From the fact that there is no necessary 
conflict between cosmopolitanism and particularist loyalties it does not follow that there is no, 
or that there cannot be any serious conflict. Such conclusion holds only if one assumes – as 
Brock does – that we know beforehand what their desired normative hierarchy is. But this 
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assumption simply begs the question: Brock frames the issue of national and cultural 
attachments in terms of permissibility, arguing that partiality in moral obligations is contingent 
on the previous fulfilment of principles of GJ (p. 265). This however sounds persuasive only for 
those who are believers in cosmopolitan justice in the first place, because the argument 
implies that only those types of special attachments which are consistent with egalitarian 
liberalism will be allowed in Brock’s world.16 Given that achieving the goals of GJ seems to be 
a highest-priority yet long-term enterprise, one might plausibly ask in what sense exactly does 
GJCA leave ample room for national, religious and other special attachments and starting 
when. It is of little consolation to “nationalists” (among which, as Brock admits, many if not 
most ordinary people in the world belong) that their “natural” loyalties will be permitted to 
flourish some time in the future, because for a yet unspecified period they will have to give 
way to cosmopolitan obligations. I do not think Brock is really realistic here, her constant 
disclaimers notwithstanding. 
There are some deeper theoretical issues here, too. It is not entirely clear why partakers in 
the global original position should reason in a liberal cosmopolitan individualist mode. Brock 
accuses the (liberal) nationalist stance of begging the question, arguing that it first needs to 
be subjected to impartial justification (p. 269). However, the circumstances of justification, i.e. 
the global original position, are already biased towards liberal cosmopolitan intuitions about 
fairness and decency – and Brock does not offer any sustained argumentation why this 
should be so. My hunch is that in order to patch up this gap, she would have to engage in a 
metaethical defence of moral universalism, or perhaps of a specific philosophical 
anthropology, without which the edifice of GJCA feels rather incomplete.17 
The other alternative (pursued forcefully by Ypi) would be to argue that we owe certain 
cosmopolitan obligations to others by virtue of extensive political, economic and cultural 
interaction, on the basis of which the rich&powerful become increasingly complicit in 
worsening, or not improving, of life conditions of the poor&weak.18 After all, her and 
Anderson’s conception of relational equality explicitly requires such “joint cooperative” 
interconnections (303). Although she hints that such analysis of causal responsibilities may 
serve as a supportive argument in her case against nationalist particularism, recall that her 
fundamental normative principles (basic needs and liberties) are non-relational. Thus, not only 
Brock does not explain what makes her preferred normative assumptions evident; it also 
seems that her vision of a global democratic community requires as its bedrock the very 
relational analysis she pays only scant attention to. 
Lastly, Brock’s view of the legitimate bounds of nationalism has the paradoxical 
consequence of leaving politics out of both GJ and political theory of nationalism. The 
paradox lies in tying political activity fundamentally to the goal of achieving GJ: Although 
Brock explores many concrete measures and institutional solutions in the abovementioned 
issue areas, attempting to close the gap between theory and practice, these are in the end 
mere administrative instruments designed to bring about a pre-determined type of (global) 
society. Put simply, political activity becomes here mostly a function of moral reasoning. For 
what we know, however, politics as such is a matter of articulation and aggregation of 
interests, as well as competition among conflicting viewpoints. This is of course just another 
version of the age-old problem of the relationship between politics and morality, and it may 
be replied in the context of GJ that what we are after are fair (just) background conditions 
for political activity. It is worth stressing, however, that according clear priority to moral 
reflection constitutes a radical departure from how politics is usually done – the issue of “dirty 
hands” being a typical example.19 Thus, although practical on one level, Brock’s vision of 
global politics reveals itself as deeply utopian on this “conceptual” plane. 
The worse for traditional politics, one may retort, and it would be a perfectly legitimate 
response. The problem here concerns Brock’s insistence on the democratic and dialogical 
nature of GJCA which does not sit well with the latent, and sometimes explicit, paternalist 
strands of her thinking. If the first virtue of politics is to secure justice, if the main justification for 
global democracy is interest-based (as opposed to “merely” improving conditions for political 
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agency), and since many if not most people are wrong or misinformed about their genuine 
interests, or the means of fulfilling them (106), then it makes little sense to let people actually 
deliberate on what kind of world they would wish to live in. What if they decide contrary to 
what cosmopolitan justice requires? To repeat, such paternalistic and monological20 
approach is wholly coherent in itself, and the propensity of political philosophers towards it is 
understandable. What cannot be coherently claimed is its seamless connectibility to politics 
as we know it. 
I will conclude this part of my essay by pointing out some difficulties in particular 
arguments that Brock puts forward in the course of her book. In her defence of needs as the 
basic “currency” of cosmopolitan justice, normatively prior even to human rights (p. 71ff.), she 
identifies five dimensions of human agency which are to be covered by the needs-based 
account of GJ (p. 66–67)21 as well as corresponding empirical measures employed to assess 
the degree of their (un)fulfilment. What Brock does not provide, however, is an elaborate 
account of the “moderate” institutional structures and mechanisms intended to secure the 
wide array of human needs. When she turns in the next chapter to Held’s, Weinstock’s and 
Kuper’s models of “democracy without borders”, she either recounts large-scale institutional 
transformations (such as Held’s idea of a directly elected second chamber of the UN, 
complemented by a system of regional and local decision-making and deliberative bodies), 
or quotes approvingly Weinstock’s argument that in real-world democracies we find a 
“dizzying array” of practices and institutions designed to secure people’s interests (106). 
But what exactly would the global measures encompass? Are they meant to replicate 
what we are familiar with in the domestic settings? In such a case we have on our hands a 
gigantic administrative and sanctioning task of global dimensions. If not, then the institutional 
middle ground between statism and world-statism remains pretty much unclear, save for 
general appeals that we must ensure adequate institutional mechanisms as well as selection, 
empowerment and control of global public officials (p. 108). As usual, the devil is in the detail, 
and Brock offers only occasional hints in this regard. The same uneasiness about vagueness 
and something-adequate-has-to-be-done attitude applies to Brock’s discussion of how to 
prevent potential abuses of power, which is cursory at best given the extensive tasks 
accorded to global democratic structures. 
This paradoxical vagueness is again manifested in several of the policy-oriented 
chapters. I expressed my reservations about the global taxation regime above; here I wish to 
comment on Brock’s largely affirmative views of humanitarian intervention (HI), tied as they 
are to redefinition of sovereignty in terms of responsibility. First of all, although she mentions in 
passing (n. 2 on p. 186) that there are voices questioning the “we can do attitude” she is so 
appreciative of (p. 136), she does not give them the slightest critical attention, perhaps 
believing they are of marginal importance. But these largely Marxian-inspired views present a 
serious challenge to the prevailing liberal order, linking HI to global capitalism as well as 
political and cultural imperialism, and ignoring them comes at a price of speaking only to the 
pre-existing circle of believers.22 
Second, the policy-oriented nature of her explorations comes down to adopting the 
Responsibility To Protect (R2P) framework as the contemporary variation on the Just War 
tradition, amending it with the idea of a “Vital Interest Protection Agency” (VIPO) which 
would take over HI-authorising powers from the UN Security Council (pp. 174, 185). Not only 
Brock does not consider the general objection that by adopting R2P-like criteria, we would in 
fact rid ourselves of the right not to intervene; she also considers it an eminently practical and 
down-to-earth set of guidelines. But this is simply not true if VIPO is to be composed of 
“representatives of all nations” and its decisions are probably to be reached unanimously (p. 
178), the less if we factor in Brock’s earlier conviction that cooperation of “most powerful 
actors” will not be necessary.23 How exactly are these rather momentous changes in 
sovereignty to be promulgated? Who are the agents of change? Perhaps Brock has 
concrete ideas and proposals up her sleeve, however she does not present them in GJCA. In 
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this regard, Lea Ypi’s account of global political agency is much more sophisticated, as we 
shall see shortly. 
Lastly, as James T. Johnson has recently argued, it is most likely a mistake to conceive of 
contemporary debates on HI, sparked by Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars, as simply a modern-
day continuation of the Just War tradition, grounded as it is (unlike much of contemporary 
liberalism) in Christian ethics and the sovereign ruler’s obligation to promote good in the 
world.24 There is thus a strong paternalist background to the tradition which actually coheres 
quite well with latent paternalism of GJCA; however, the possible linkages could have been 
probably argued for and not just simply assumed. 
Moving on to Brock’s case for limits on permissible special attachments, she sets out to 
criticise the “concentric circles model of responsibility” which she presents as stating that 
“responsibilities are generally stronger to those physically or affectively close to us”. Brock 
counters this perhaps dominant attitude by claiming that our “basic obligations to others do 
not diminish with distance” (p. 275), and criticises as unconvincing the nationalist argument 
from “psychological affiliation”: “If we can [feel connected to] groups of, say, 300 million 
people, it is hard to see how we cannot do this for yet larger collectives” (p. 281). I am afraid 
this is exactly the point – it is hard to see how to go about achieving this, as the difficulties with 
forging and cultivating common European identity attest. 
Now towards the very end of GJCA Brock invests a lot of hope into the idea of education 
for world citizenship which should provide the “necessary motivation” for seeing ourselves as 
world citizens, suggesting that school curricula “could be revised to promote understanding 
of our global problems” and adding that “there is a flourishing movement around the world 
to do exactly that” (p. 332). Maybe there is, however its impact on national educational 
legislation is hardly traceable – or Brock at least does not provide any clues. I have a different 
worry though: The whole edifice of GJCA has been rested on the conviction that major 
changes can be readily implemented, whereas suddenly Brock admits that the sense of 
common global identity which is required for reasons of feasibility and stability will have to be 
gradually introduced via life-long (re-)education. Again, Ypi’s analysis is more sophisticated 
and attentive to detail in this particular regard. 
Let me conclude this part on a more sympathetic note: Although I have been at times 
highly critical both of certain conceptual choices and particular arguments, GJCA is in fact a 
highly original, well-researched, and systematic book-length treatment of global justice, and 
will be read with benefit by both specialists and non-specialists in the field. Perhaps Lea Ypi’s 
book offers further remedies to the failings of the previous two volumes? That is what I turn to 
next. 
 
Theorising Global Justice With Ypi 
We have seen that GJ theorising revolves to a large extent around certain distinctions 
and/or dichotomies that structure our thinking about justice beyond the state. Some of them 
are constitutive of and necessary for cosmopolitan discourse, such as the alleged 
independence between moral and political (constitutional) versions of cosmopolitanism. 
Others are more problematic, however, because they result in tensions between seemingly 
incompatible positions, and GJ theorists are pressed towards picking sides: Such are the 
dichotomies between theory and practice, between ideal and non-ideal theory, and 
between statists and cosmopolitans as such. Gillian Brock presented one attempt to deal 
with the problem, although in a rather latent fashion, concealed behind explorations of 
practical and feasible steps towards fulfilling cosmopolitan obligations. 
Lea Ypi’s Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency (GJAPA) approaches the 
question from the other direction, establishing her argumentation firmly on the third 
(metatheoretical) level. GJAPA can be therefore most generally understood as a book-
length exercise in transcending dichotomies and reconciling opposites, and Ypi employs a 
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philosophical method which seems especially suited for this purpose – that is, dialectics. 
Anticipating traditional objections to Hegelian-type dialectics, she stresses that her version is 
meant as a heuristic device for normative assesment – how we can achieve progress in 
political-philosophical argument, and know for sure that it is progress at all – , rather than as 
an instrument of revealing objective truth or the internal logic of transformative processes (p. 
43). I will have some comments to add below; here I wish to note that she rests her 
cosmopolitan case on respectable methodological foundations. 
In comparison with Brock, Ypi also takes more seriously the tension between ideal and 
non-ideal theory, which in her view has significant purchase on the reconcilability of 
theoretical suggestions and real-world constraints on political action – and, ultimately, on the 
general  dispute over legitimacy of nation-states in a cosmopolitan world. Ypi argues, quite 
convincingly in my view, that both statists and cosmopolitans (or at least most of them) apply 
the wrong approach to wrong types of question: On the one hand, statists counter normative 
(principled) defences of cosmopolitanism by stressing how these theoretical accounts ignore 
facts about the social world (e.g. people are citizens of states and have certain associative 
obligations which are therefore normatively prior to universal cosmopolitan obligations), and 
conversely, attempt to derive normative principles from considerations of (the conditions of) 
effective political agency (i.e. unjustifyingly idealising them). On the other hand, 
cosmopolitans are too satisfied to provide detailed normative argumentation (ideal theory) 
while underestimating non-ideal issues of agency, that is, how to ensure that these principles 
will be carried out – which is an echo of the twin problems of feasibility and stability 
addressed by Brock. Ypi shows that it is only part of a larger set of problems, and in this sense 
her account is more complex and perhaps more promising, although at first glance less 
directly concerned with “practical solutions”. 
Another commendable feature of Ypi’s book comes with the first chapter, “The Historical 
Controversy”, where the author reaches back to history of political thought, outlining 
especially the debate on possibilities and limits of cosmopolitanism that was taking place 
during the Enlightenment period. This is a useful reminder that contemporary problems of 
political philosophy are very much just recent reformulations of perennial issues. Ypi skilfully 
shows the exchange between authors such as Leibniz, Voltaire, Rousseau, and especially 
Kant, who she believes showed the way how to combine “principled commitments of 
cosmopolitanism with political agency expressed through membership in the state” (p. 23). 
Apart from the ability to link fundamental moral principles and political agency needed to 
implement them, Ypi identifies further strong points of Kantian and Rousseauian approaches 
to justice: Central importance of conflict for articulating demands of justice; focus on the 
causes of existing injustices; and the role of popular sovereignty and civic education in 
ensuring political effectiveness and motivational sustainability of our principled commitments. 
Distil all this into the abovementioned dialectical framework, add significant conceptual 
and political space reserved for a “cosmopolitan avant-garde” that will push the case – 
again both philosophically and politically – for cosmopolitan justice, and as a result we get a 
philosophically robust case for cosmopolitan justice that is “both backward looking and 
forward looking” (p. 63): Sensitive to facts about contemporary societies and their histories, 
yet always aware of the possibility of transcending the (unjust) status quo. This is, in a nutshell, 
how Ypi wishes to resolve the tension between ideal and non-ideal theory while escaping the 
respective charges of irrelevance and status quo bias. At the same time, her theory of GJ 
acquires from the very beginning a decidedly activist character, within which “the theorist 
has ceased to be a mere spectator and assumes a politically active role” (p. 65). 
In chapters 3–6, Ypi unpacks her general framework in more detail. Her rejection of 
statism relies precisely on the argument that normative (moral) principles and conditions of 
political agency are two separate issues; therefore, the current inadequacy of the latter for 
implementing demanding principles of GJ does not entail that these principles themselves 
are inadequate or wrong. Although critical of those versions of global egalitarianism which 
are reliant on the argument from moral arbitrariness of political membership (i.e. to which 
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country one has been born; p. 121), as well of those which limit their critical focus to certain 
negative consequences of the status quo (rather than their causes), Ypi shows that moral 
concerns about relative deprivation, and subsequently about reducing global inequalities, 
can be rescued in a different way – namely, by showing that there exists a both causally and 
normatively fundamental link between absolute and relative deprivation of actors in world 
politics (pp. 97ff.). Ypi believes that this link is provided by global positional goods, which she 
defines as “those goods the absolute value of which is determined by their relative 
possession” (p. 109). Thus fifth chapter is devoted to convincing the reader that “in specific 
circumstances of injustice, the claim for sufficiency at the level of individuals triggers a claim 
for distributive equality (at least) at the level of states“(p. 111). In other words, global 
sufficientarianism entails global egalitarianism; notice that this is a counter not only to statists 
such as David Miller or John Rawls, but also to “moderate” cosmopolitans such as Gillian 
Brock. 
For Ypi, power wielded by states represents the most important global positional good, 
not least because it is a plausible concept even for statists/nationalists/realists.25 In the 
international realm, power represents the type of means that allows the holder of power to 
achieve other desired things (e.g. to obtain certain economic goods), and Ypi points, among 
others, to the WTO trade agenda to substantiate her claim that inequalities of bargaining 
and/or negotiating power result in legal and economic rules that are heavily loaded in favour 
of the rich and powerful. Agricultural subsidies and high tariffs on imports are then prime 
examples of resulting policies that are causally linkable to the absolute deprivation of the 
weak and poor, as is their dependence on external material assistance in exchange for 
support for rules and policies which are in fact against their interests. 
Getting finally to the issue of political agency, Ypi positions herself against many 
cosmopolitans by arguing that states, at least for the foreseeable future, will be the main 
agents of change – that is why she labels her theory “statist cosmopolitanism”. She argues 
that in order for political transformation to take and remain in place, two important features 
of modern societies need to be secured – popular sovereignty (i.e. democratic rule) and 
civic education. Cosmopolitan theories of GJ then represent a set of voices that enter the 
democratic debate about the “function and purpose of particular institutions” (p. 148), with 
the aim of tilting public opinion towards cosmopolitan goals. We have seen saw in the 
preceding section that also in Gillian Brock’s just world, states would probably play an 
important role backed by gradual “education for world citizenship”; however, Ypi’s 
contextualization is much more careful and fits quite naturally in the larger theoretical 
framework. This also applies to her concluding remarks in Chapter 7 on the “cosmopolitan 
avant-garde” which is the politically active face of cosmopolitan theories of GJ, playing “a 
crucial role in sensitizing local publics to issues of transnational conflict and global inequality, 
and in enacting the learning process that gradually leads to challenging and replacing old 
categories and conceptual resources with new and more progressive ones“ (p. 155). 
Now for a more philosophically minded type of reader, or someone who is looking for 
accounts of GJ which are robust on all levels of theorising, Ypi’s GJAPA is the book to go to, 
at least out of the three titles under review here. That said, certain doubts still loom over the 
argument, although my exposition will be necessarily limited. Firstly, although Ypi builds her 
theoretical case very carefully, it seems that there are certain blind, unargued-for spots. One 
example is provided on p. 92 where she concludes that responsibility-based arguments 
against global egalitarian principles would, at pains of inconsistency, undermine also 
redistributive measures in domestic societies. In note 10 she admits that this may be construed 
as a good reason to weaken redistributionist requirements even on the national level, but 
dismisses such an idea because her targets are statist egalitarians. We may ask then, what 
about those who would take this road – for example some type of statist libertarians? 
Unfortunately GJAPA does not engage this kind of sceptics, and in an important sense her 
core normative commitments are left without defence, that is, unjustified. 
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Another example of assuming rather than substantiating the rightness of (global) 
egalitarianism are hints to the need of complex and difficult empirical calculations of how the 
alleged global positional goods (above all power) aggravate, or at least obstruct 
improvements upon, the existing global circumstances of injustice (p. 121ff.). But unless such 
empirical explorations have been carried out, we cannot actually know whether Ypi is right or 
not: After all, notable economists have gone on record defending free trade (and perhaps 
enforceable property rights), not global equality, as the only tested means of doing away 
with poverty, even if not in an uncritical, total laissez-faire manner.26 Ypi unfortunately does 
not offer any sustained analysis, and recounts instead several examples having to do with 
agricultural production or the abovementioned trade barriers. I have the suspicion, however, 
that such reflections are too impressionistic and perhaps vague in order to ground the very 
strong normative conclusions Ypi wishes to defend. In general, her central argument in this 
part, namely that “the absence of [global] egalitarian obligations is causally fundamental for 
emergence of absolute deprivation” (p. 100) is so strong that it would need much more 
systematic economic framework as well as empirical basis. In this sense, her claim that 
contemporary cosmopolitans ignore studying the causes of poverty and instead focus on 
remedies for its consequences (pp. 89, 96) is true and false at the same time: On the one 
hand, it may be true about many cosmopolitan philosophers about justice (although it 
definitely does not apply to some renowned figures in the field such as Thomas Pogge).27 On 
the other hand, it is patently false with regard to the field of development economics, and 
the problem with her argument is, again, that she simply assumes her non-economic analysis 
to be right. 
My next objection is closely related and concerns Ypi’s understanding and definition of 
power in world politics. Whereas her account of GJ especially on the level of political agency 
is largely constructivist, meaning that actor’s interests, goals and identities are malleable 
(though not immediately changeable) through norms, values, and ideas,  in her analysis of 
power in international relations she opts for a neo-realist, zero-sum game delineation of 
power as a wholly positional good. But this is an arbitrary move triggered by her previous 
normative commitments, perhaps incoherent with the constructivist perspective, and at any 
rate the egalitarian conclusion does not follow: Precisely because power need not have to 
be a zero-sum game, because it need not have to be understood in the sense of one actor 
manipulating another actor (power over) but as a collective capability (power to), and 
because there are many faces of power beside the military one on which Ypi ultimately rests 
her case, her conclusion that “leveling down” of power on the part of the rich and powerful is 
the only way how to ensure equal playing field is not warranted. 
Lastly, let me spend a few thoughts on the idea of a cosmopolitan avant-garde (CAG). 
Although this is another original and on the whole inspiring contribution of Ypi’s work, it seems 
doubtful that we can tell progressive movements from those leading into blind alleys in 
advance. Only after the dialectical process has taken place can we retrospectively discover 
who was right, and it is quite hard to predict who will be the heroes and the villains in, say, 50 
years’ time. A closely related worry stems from Ypi’s latent but necessary assumption that the 
CAG movement will be able to express a coherent, compatible set of normative and political 
demands. For as far as we know, it is a quite heterogeneous group – even if we stick to the 
reviewed books, we have on our hands disagreement between Brock the sufficientarian and 
Ypi the egalitarian. Are they all aware of themselves being members of the CAG (that is, are 
they an “avant-garde for itself”)? Do all of them, including non-western actors, share Ypi’s 
narrative and corresponding goals? What about the (very real) possibility of conflicts within 
the CAG? Ypi suggests that a coherent and complex set of demands of GL could be 
established on the basis of a careful “case-by-case analysis” (p. 173), but this reminds of 
Gillian Brock’s hopeful optimism, which is in turn an example of a “reverse naturalistic fallacy”: 
If something is believed to be right, then it has to be realized. 
*** 
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My goal in this review essay has been to show the strengths and weaknesses of three 
recent contributions to the debate on global justice, and to explain how political philosophy 
can be done on different levels of theorizing. Each of the three books brings to the table 
assets that the other two lack, and the final verdict about “which one is the best” very much 
depends on what kind of reader actually reaches out for either of the volumes, and what 
kind of problems she wants to have covered or explicated. I have deliberately tried to assess 
the books on their own merits, without invoking competing normative views (apart from 
passages where these views have been neglected despite their importance for the 
argument). Such preliminary “structuring” of the field is useful and perhaps necessary, in my 
view, in order to pursue one’s own road through substantive debates on promises and 
drawbacks of global justice, as seen through cosmopolitan glasses. I venture to say that these 
debates may turn out to have critical impact on how politics, both domestic and 
transnational, is done in the 21st century, and since they have been gradually acquiring a 
systematic framework based on an increasingly firmer groundwork, interested readers are 
warmly invited to dig deeper and wider.28 
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